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Eric Franklin*
ABSTRACT
The law of charities governs an absurdly wide-ranging field of
organizations. A small group of antiquated statutes purport to govern a
diversity of entities that range from hospitals worth millions of dollars to
purely volunteer-run organizations that provide free childcare. Given the
expansive nature of the law of charities, perhaps it is understandable that the
law lacks a coherent guiding principle. This alone would not be problematic
if not for the fact that most tax-exempt organizations do not comport with
the general public’s idea of charity. An intuitive definition of charity relies
upon a lack of self-regard. In other words, charity requires some level of
altruism. But many charities pay lavish salaries and some are major players
in the crass commercialism of the private market; such activities are far
from any reasonable definition of altruism. Thus, to the extent that we
expect charitable organizations to exhibit some level of altruism, the
concept of charity has been stretched to a level that is almost
unrecognizable.
In addition to diluting the concept of charity, the over-inclusive nature
of tax-exempt law resulted in an unreasonable administrative burden for the
IRS. Entities vying for charitable status flooded the agency with tax-exempt
applications, crippling the IRS and resulting in an unacceptable backlog. To
address this, the IRS created a streamlined application to make the
application process more efficient. But critics claim that the streamlined
process lacks anything resembling rigor and provides precious little data for
evaluation.
Somewhat surprisingly, and certainly unintentionally, the IRS’s solution
to its administrative burden provides an opportunity to address the law
allowing charities to act in a less-than-altruistic manner. The IRS’s
desperate attempt to curtail its administrative burden presents the occasion
to create a new family of charities—one that does not strain any traditional
definition of “charity.” This Article argues that, in exchange for the use of
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this streamlined process, charities should agree to forgo salaried employees
and commercial activity. Such charities will, in a very real sense, be forced
to operate in a more altruistic manner. Thus, these charities will be, in a
sense, more charitable.
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INTRODUCTION
No one is quite sure why charities are exempt from taxes.1 And make no
mistake: the exemption is significant.2 In 2013 alone, nonprofit
organizations reported $2.26 trillion in revenues and $5.17 trillion in
1

“It is extraordinary that no generally accepted rationale exists for the multi-billion
dollar exemption from income and property taxes that is universally conferred on
‘charitable’ institutions” – Colombo 91, 1381
2
Crimm 424 (“The magnitude of the pecuniary benefit enjoyed by charitable
organizations because of various tax exemptions is enormous”)
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assets.3 By one estimate, this amounts to approximately five percent of
America’s gross domestic product.4 If accurate, this is a staggering amount
of potential tax revenue. Given the size of the sector, one would assume that
there is a well-reasoned justification for foregoing this revenue.
Unfortunately, that assumption is incorrect.
Despite the fact that America’s definition of charity can trace its roots to
the dawn of the 17th century in England,5 legal scholars have only recently
attempted to justify the tax-exempt nature of certain charities. Most theories
are predominately descriptive in nature, with some normative elements.6
But they each fail to provide a comprehensively descriptive account of the
tax-exemption of charities.7 The traditional theory posits that we should
promote charitable activity through tax-exemption because charities lighten
the burden of the government.8 Other leading theories9 suggest economic
3

This number represents reporting nonprofits, and only accounts for 35% of the
nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS. Urban Institute, National Center for
Charitable Statistics. http://www.urban.org/research/publication/nonprofit-sector-brief2015-public-charities-giving-and-volunteering.
4
Tax-Exempt Organizations: Better Compliance Indicators and Data, and More
Collaboration with State Regulators Would Strengthen Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, United States Government Accountability Office, December 2014, Page 1
(GAO Report).
5
Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
101, 101 (2016) (“The definition of charity in American law originates from England’s
Statute of Charitable Uses. Passed in 1601, the statute coincidentally produced a legal
definition of charity.”). But see Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax
Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLORIDA
LAW. R. 419, 425 (1998) (“The seeds of the tax exemption notion for American
‘charitable’ organizations can be traced to fourteenth century England.”).
6
See Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities:
Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 398 (1991) (“Exemption
theories often rest, explicitly or implicitly, on descriptive accounts of the role of charity,
but they themselves are normative.”).
7
The reason for this failure is likely due to the very desire to form a coherent theory in
the first place. As Professor Atkinson notes, “If … we want a theory that takes account of
the ‘charity’ of charities…, we are bound to be disappointed. At best, we will find a proxy
for what we are inclined to believe is the real criterion. Alternatively, if we admit charity to
be a complex phenomenon, we avoid the fallacy of the one true way, but only at the price
of a seriously complicated legal definition. … [W]e can be sure from the outset that a legal
definition of charity will not be entirely satisfactory, in large part because some of the
things we want in an exemption theory are at odds with others.” See Atkinson, supra note
[4] at 401-02.
8
The subsidy theory’s roots are found in legislative history. See H.R.Rep. No 751860, at 19 (3d Sess. 1938) (“The exemption from taxation …is based upon the theory that
the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds.”).
9
Not included in this embarrassingly short and inadequate summary of the theories
justifying tax-exemption is Professors Boris Bittker and George Rahdert’s foundational
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justifications for the tax-exemption due to market failures,10 rationalizations
based on the unreasonable amount of risk assumed by nonprofit
organizations,11 legitimizing the tax-exempt regime based on the sector’s
promotion of altruism,12 and an economic argument that tax-exemption
should hinge on the level of donations a charity receives.13 However, none
of these theories has provided a universally-accepted justification for taxexemption.14
This failure is due to the absurdly complex nature of the law governing
tax-exempt entities, a complexity born out of a general and persistent
carelessness that has characterized the tax-exempt regime since its inception
in American law. Our current tax-exempt system was born out of centuries
of blindly adopted common law, a hodge-podge of court decisions, and a
panoply of unprincipled Congressional acts. This has led to the facially
absurd notion that the same vague statute purports to govern the tax
exemption of churches, amateur bowling leagues, hospitals, and
universities. To put a finer point on it (and highlight the absurdity), a single
exemption—Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
“Code”)—governs the tax-exemption of each of the following
organizations: a volunteer-driven charity that provides afterschool
mentorship and tutoring to children in a public housing development;15 a
hate group that routinely interrupts military funerals with signs reading God
Hates Fags and Thank God for Dead Soldiers;16 an organization dedicated
to preventing domestic violence and sheltering battered women;17 an

income measurement theory, which suggests that traditional accounting methods do not
permit taxation of nonprofit income. Boris I Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption
of Nonprofit Organizations from the Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L. J. 299 (1976).
10
See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L. J. 54 (1981).
11
See Crimm, supra note [3].
12
Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990).
13
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66
WASH L. REV. 307 (1991).
14
See Nina Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLORIDA L. REV. 419 (“[I]t
may appear remarkable that there is no universally-accepted theory to explain the
fundamental reason underlying the deliberate and continued conferral of [the tax]
exemption on all qualifying charitable organizations.”).
15
See Nevada Youth Network, discussed more fully in Section [___].
16
See Westboro Baptist Church homepage at http://www.godhatesfags.com/ (warning,
site is extremely offensive).
17
See National Coalition Against Domestic Violence homepage at
http://www.ncadv.org/about-us/mission
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organization devoted to an obscure sport known as curling;18 and a church
that promotes suicide, abortion, cannibalism, and sodomy.19
Given this poor foundation, it may not be surprising that our charities
don’t look very, for lack of a better word, charitable. The colloquial
definition of “charity,” based on the etymological origins of the word, is a
“selfless, other-regarding love.”20 It is this lack of self-interest that defines
the non-legal conception of charity. But charities in the United States may
engage in a number of activities that most would consider antithetical to any
definition of “charity” that requires a lack of self-regard. More to the point,
charity leaders may earn handsome and lavish salaries and many of our
most cherished public charities are major participants in the private market.
Complicating matters, the process for obtaining tax-exempt status is
influenced more by administrative necessity than any coherent theoretical
foundation. The application process lies in the hands of the Internal
Revenue Service (the “IRS”). Regardless of whether the IRS is the proper
agency to determine appropriateness of tax-exemption for a particular
organization, a query that is beyond the scope of this paper,21 the IRS has
proven to be wholly incapable of conducting a meaningful investigation
into the worthiness of would-be tax-exempt entities in an efficient manner.
Setting aside any substantive criticisms of the IRS’s tax-exemption
application process,22 the agency has proven unable to keep up with the
number of applicants, amassing an unacceptably large backlog of taxexempt applications.23 To address this, the IRS took a rather dramatic step.
With the assumption that not all applications require the same level of
scrutiny, the IRS crafted an application process designed specifically for
small organizations. Fortunately, the streamlined application process freed
up IRS resources to successfully tackle the backlog. But the IRS was able to
address the backlog so quickly due to the inadequacy of the streamlined
process. It is virtually devoid of either rigor or investigation. For this
18

See USA Curling Association at http://www.teamusa.org/usa-curling/aboutus/about-usa-curling
19
See Church of Euthanasia at http://www.churchofeuthanasia.org/ (warning, site is
extremely offensive).
20
Atkinson, supra note [4] at 399.
21
There is a strong argument to be made that the IRS, designed as a tax-collecting
entity, was never meant to serve an oversight role.
22
From a substantive standpoint, many critics claim that unqualified organizations
obtain tax-exempt status and that the tax-exempt application process suffered from political
targeting. Jackie Calmes, Senate Report Cites I.R.S. Mismanagement in Targeting of Tea
Party Groups, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 2015, (“A Senate committee on Wednesday closed a
two-year investigation with unanimous agreement that mismanagement at the Internal
Revenue Service led it to improperly target conservative groups seeking tax-exempt
status.”).
23
See discussion infra [__]
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reason, the streamlined application process has been widely criticized, with
one commentator noting that “[i]n many communities, it takes more to get a
library card than it takes to get this new exempt status.”24 And that criticism
is no understatement; it is not an exaggeration to characterize the
streamlined process as little more than allowing organizations to opt-in to
the tax-exempt realm with virtually no IRS inquiry into the applicants’
worthiness.
Although the IRS’s decision represents a dramatic change in policy to
the tax-exempt application process, it is not the first time that the IRS has
decided to lighten the regulatory and administrative burden of smaller
nonprofit organizations. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
streamlined application process for smaller organizations and the required
annual information disclosures for smaller organizations. In each case, the
IRS has determined that organizations with annual gross receipts of less
than $50,000 require less scrutiny. From the perspective of applications, we
have the recently-enacted streamlined application process for organizations
that reasonable expect to less than $50,000 in gross receipts in any of the
ensuing three years. From the perspective of annual information reports,
organizations that had less than $50,000 in gross receipts are not required to
provide any meaningful disclosures regarding precisely how much money
was received by the organization, how any funds were spent, or even if the
organization engaged in any meaningful charitable work. Thus, the IRS has
determined that any organization that realizes less than $50,000 in gross
receipts will not be vetted on the front-end (the application stage) or the
back-end (during operations).
Unfortunately, although not surprisingly, this policy shift appears to
have been made entirely with a view to administrative expediency, without
much apparent thoughtful consideration of policy concerns. The IRS looked
at the backlog of applications, considered a dwindling budget,25 and made a
decision based wholly on administrative necessity.
This is a missed opportunity. The streamlined application process
provides a chance to reassess the tax-exempt organization regime. The
IRS’s desperate attempt to curtail its administrative burden presents the
occasion to create a new family of charities—one that does not strain any
traditional definition of “charity.”
This Article argues that, in exchange for the use of this streamlined
24

Patricia Cohen, IR.S. Shortcut to Tax-Exempt Status is Under Fire, The New York
Times, April 8, 2015.
25
“[T]he IRS budget has declined by about $900 million since fiscal year 2010 and
funding is below fiscal year 2009 levels.” GAO Report, supra note [__] at 1; “Staffing has
declined by about 10,000 full-time equivalents since fiscal year 2010, and performance has
been uneven.” GAO Report, supra note [__] at 1.
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process and the minimal annual scrutiny, charities should agree to forgo
salaried employees and commercial activity. This Article will argue that
such restrictions are reasonable responses to the virtual lack of scrutiny
endured by such organizations. And by foregoing both salaries and
commercial activity, such charities will, in a very real sense, be forced to
operate in a more altruistic manner. As such, these charities will be more
charitable.
Part I of this Article discusses the charitable legal regime generally. It
highlights the law’s numerous efforts to impose altruism on charitable
organizations, and discusses the various compromises that detract from such
efforts. Specifically, this part discusses policies that restrict individuals
from obtaining personal enrichment from charitable organizations and the
exceptions that undermine such policies. Part II discusses the means by
which we award charitable status, paying particular attention to the
recently-adopted streamlined application process. This part will pay
particular attention to the strongest criticisms of the streamlined application,
illustrating how the new process fails to properly vet charities. This part will
also discuss the process by which the IRS monitors charitable activity,
arguing that the lowered scrutiny enjoyed by small organizations not only at
the application process, but also during the organization’s operations,
provides the justification for imposing a more restrictive spectrum of
permissible activities. Part III of this Article explains how the IRS’s
decisions provide the opportunity to impose more stringent requirements on
such entities. Specifically, this section will argue that charities that opt to
use the streamlined application ought to be prohibited from paying salaries
and engaging in commercial activity. In doing so, not only will the taxexempt regime will create a family of charities that are required to act in a
more altruistic manner, but also reduce the risk of such charities operating
without oversight.
I. DEFINING CHARITY: PRACTICALITY OVER IDEALISM
What comes to mind when you think of a charity? If you are able to set
aside legal definitions and real-world examples to reach a more abstract
formulation, you will likely focus on the motives of the actor. If the actor is
driven by self-interest, greed, or personal gain, then the act is not likely to
meet any intuitive definition of charity. This notion that any definition of
charity must emphasize a lack of self-regard is in harmony with
etymological origins of the word, which recall notions of “selfless, otherregarding love.”26 It is this lack of self-interest that defines the non-legal
26

Atkinson, supra note [4] at 399.
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conception of charity. It expresses “the kind of selfless regard for others that
we associate with the core of charity.”27
The conception of charity as a selfless endeavor was perhaps most
famously described by attorney and politician Horace Binney. According to
Mr. Binney, charity consists of “[w]hatever is given … free from the stain
or taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or selfish.”28 This
characterization of charity appeals to our intuitive sense that any definition
of charity should only include those acts done without any self-regard. It
attempts to codify the popular notion that most people consider charitable
acts to be those that are selfless. Or to put it another way, one engages in
charity when he or she gives something without an expectation of
something in return. The determinative factor is likely to be the level of
altruism in the act.29 The more altruistic the act, the more comfortable we
feel bestowing the “charitable” label to the act.
To the extent this is true, then the popular conception of charity is very
different from the legal definition of charity. Charities30 in the United States
may engage in a number of activities that most would consider neither
altruistic nor selfless. More to the point, charity leaders often earn
handsome salaries and many of our most cherished public charities are
major participants in the private market.
Perhaps we stomach these facially uncharitable actions because of the
organizations’ concomitant good works. In a vacuum, a leader of a charity
who receives an annual salary of over a million dollars does not seem very
charitable. But perhaps it is reasonable for the American Cancer Society to
pay its chief executive officer over $1.2 million in total annual
compensation because of the organization’s laudable achievements in
treating cancer, addressing cancer-related public health issues, and
providing services to cancer patients.31 Similarly, we may not be
comfortable with a charity that oversees a commercial enterprise that makes
almost three-quarters of a billion dollars in the private market. But maybe
we do not mind that the Girl Scouts of America realize an annual revenue of
about $700 million from cookie sales in light of their work promoting selfesteem and leadership skills in young girls.32
27

Id. at 421.
See The Girard Will Case, 2 How. 194, 11 U.S. (L.ed.) 205)
29
Atkinson, supra note [4] at 401 (“The most intuitively appealing single criterion of
charitable status is the squishy one we have already identified: selfless love of others.”).
30
For the purposes of this Article, “charity” will refer to a 501(c)(3) organization
categorized as a public charity.
31
See American Cancer Association Form 990 available at [__]
32
Thornton McEnery and Gus Lubin, How the Girl Scouts Built Their Cookie Empire,
BUSINESS INSIDER, March 24, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/how-thegirl-scouts-built-their-cookie-empire-2011-3.
28
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The determination of what we consider charity is more than a
philosophical concern, as charitable status carries significant consequences.
If the IRS bestows 501(c)(3) status to an entity, the entity is not only
exempted from federal income taxes, but an entity’s donors may also deduct
contributions from their personal tax liability.33 Further, many states
piggyback on the IRS’s determination and provide analogous benefits in the
form of exemptions from state income and sales taxes. Finally, the
501(c)(3) designation serves as the federal government’s explicit
imprimatur and strongly suggests that the entity is worthy of special
treatment. Given these consequences, it is in our interest to carefully
consider the appropriateness of what we allow our charities to do. More
specifically, should we allow charities to engage in such patently nonaltruistic acts as paying generous salaries or playing a significant role in the
private market?
A. Altruism for the Real World
If we would prefer our charities to behave in a manner more in line with
Mr. Binney’s altruistic expectations, we are failing. But perhaps our
flexibility is born out of practicality. After all, if we are going to charge a
governmental agency with the determination of charitable status, any legal
definition of charity must be one that is objectively measurable. And from
this perspective, Mr. Binney’s definition fails. To require an organization to
be “free from the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal,
private, or selfish” necessitates some mechanism of reliably gauging
individual motives. Gauging the inner motivations of individuals has
perplexed philosophers for centuries, and this conundrum is certainly not
likely to be solved by the IRS. Thus, if we would like our charities to
exhibit altruism, we need an administratively feasible way to measure
altruism. However appealing and elegant Mr. Binney’s definition of charity
may be, it is not an appropriate definition to adopt as government policy
because it is virtually impossible to police. How, precisely, is the IRS
expected to suss out the motivations of an entity to determine whether or
not the entity exhibits any “consideration that is personal, private, or
selfish,” and is therefore undeserving of tax-exempt status?
Such a test would be, at best, impracticable, and it is for this reason that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deemed it infeasible.34 Although
admitting that Mr. Binney’s definition is “undoubtedly charity in its highest
and noblest sense,” the judge noted that “if we were to apply it to the
33

See generally, Publication 557: Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization,
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (Rev. February 2016).
34
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 (1888).
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transactions of this wicked world, I fear it would lead to utter
embarrassment … for it is God only who can look into the heart and judge
of motives.”35 With the quite reasonable determination that a court is unable
to determine the amount of self-interest in any given action, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania took the position that any legal definition of charity
would necessarily be limited to something we can observe. This necessarily
rules out the use of individual motives as a measure of charity, because “[i]t
would be as vain as it would be unprofitable for a human tribunal to
speculate upon the motives of men.”36
Thus, we require a more practical test for determining what constitutes a
charity. The IRS has developed a complex regime to determine whether or
not an entity deserves the benefits of charitable status, a process that is
investigated in depth in Part II of this Article. But several of the core
components of the IRS’s test are interesting in that they appear to serve as a
rough approximation of Mr. Binney’s altruistic definition of charities. These
components—the nondistribution constraint, the prohibition of private
inurement (a close cousin of the nondistribution constraint), and the
requirement that charities restrict activities to their charitable purpose—are
each discussed in the following sections. However, before discussing how
policymakers have attempted to approximate altruism in the laws that
govern nonprofits, we should be careful not to impute too much
intentionality to the laws and policies that govern tax-exempt entities. The
fact that nonprofit law lies on a poorly considered foundation is a frequent
lament of nonprofit scholars.37 This is, to say the least, troubling. Because
charities do not pay any federal income tax, our government has decided to
forego a significant potential revenue source. While there are many
principled reasons to treat charities differently from other entities, and there
are certainly good reasons to promote charitable activity (and perhaps
exemption from taxes and other benefits might be the perfect way to
promote such activity), this decision was not made in any principled or
well-reasoned fashion. It is therefore a bit disingenuous to speak of taxexempt policies designed to approximate altruism. However, I believe the
assumptions made in the following sections are both reasonable and
defensible.
35

Id.
Id. The court continued to opine “[w]ho can say that the millionaire who founds a
hospital or endows a college, and carves his name thereon in imperishable marble, does so
from the love to God and love to his fellow, free from the stain of selfishness? Yet is the
hospital or the college any the less a public charity because the primary object of the
founder or donor may have been to gratify his vanity…? There is ostentation in giving as
well as in the other transactions of life.”
37
See discussion, supra, notes [___].
36
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1. Nondistribution Constraint
The term “nonprofit,” when referring to charities, is a bit of a misnomer.
There is, in fact, no restriction prohibiting charities from making a profit.38
Indeed, if a charity consistently does not realize any profits, it would
probably result in a failure. Profits, after all, are how charities pay for their
charitable works. Without profits, Goodwill wouldn’t be able to pay rent to
keep its stores open, the American Lung Association wouldn’t be able to
conduct research on lung disease, and Habitat for Humanity wouldn’t be
able to purchase building materials.
Given the practical necessity of generating profits, and assuming we
would like to encourage charitable activity through the tax-exemption
process, it would not be a very good policy decision to restrict profitmaking activities by charities. Thankfully, the tax-exempt legal regime does
not prohibit charities from making a profit.39 Rather, charities have
restrictions on how they may spend their profits. To wit: charities may not
distribute profits to individuals. This restriction, coined the “nondistribution
constraint” by Professor Henry Hansmann, is widely considered the
defining characteristic of all charities.40 Born out of the provision that
prohibits private inurement,41 the nondistribution constraint requires that
“[n]et earnings, if any, must be retained and devoted in their entirety to
financing further production of the services that the organization was
formed to provide.”42 The nondistribution constraint is such a core concept
in the law of charities that, in order for an organization to enjoy tax-exempt
treatment, the organization must have the nondistribution constraint in its
formation documents.43
Like much of the laws governing tax-exempt entities, policymakers
have not expressed a clear justification for the nondistribution constraint.
However, there is reason to believe it serves as a practical means of
38

Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 837, 835 (1980)
(“[A] nonprofit organization is not barred from earning a profit. Many nonprofits in fact
consistently show an annual accounting surplus.”)
39
Id.
40
Id. at 838.
41
See discussion infra, notes [___].
42
Id.
43
Id. (“[T]he nondistribution constraint is imposed, either explicitly or implicitly, as a
condition under which the organization receives its corporate charter.”). Note that this
requirement draws a clear line between nonprofit organizations and for-profit
organizations. Corporations are owned by shareholders, limited liability companies are
owned by members, and partnerships are owned by partners. Non-profit organizations, on
the other hand, have no owners. ((“[A] nonprofit corporation is distinguished from a forprofit (or ‘business’) corporation primarily by the absence of stock or other indicia of
ownership that give their owners a simultaneous share in both profits and control.”).
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approximating altruism. The nondistribution constraint requires a charity to
spend profits in furtherance of its exempt purpose. In other words, charity’s
profits must be spent in a charitable manner. This is a means of
approximating altruism; no matter how much an organization may have in
reserves, the organization may not distribute these funds to individuals.44
Rather than adopting Mr. Binney’s conception of charity, which would
require a review of each use of a charity’s net earnings to determine the
intent motivating such use, the nondistribution constraint attempts to
remove any possibility of non-altruistic distributions by requiring all
distributions to be charitable in nature. Although this does not completely
remove “the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or
selfish,” the nondistribution constraint undoubtedly limits the ability of
individuals involved with the organization to enrich themselves at the
expense of the organization.45
Thus, the primary appeal of the nondistribution constraint is that it
serves as a practical means to impose altruistic activity. It is a formal
restriction against making payments to individuals out of the charity’s
profits (i.e., a structural impediment to acting with self-regard), and serves
as an imposition of an objectively measurable means of ensuring some level
of altruism. While we cannot guess as to the motives of individuals running
charities, the nondistribution constraint provides some certainty that excess
earnings of the organization are not funneled to individuals. And while we
are a far cry from a complete absence of “the stain or taint of every
consideration that is personal, private, or selfish,” the nondistribution
constraint serves as a pragmatic mechanism that comes as close to altruism
as feasibility allows.
44

This does not include salaries, which are described in more detail below. See infra
notes [___].
45
If the goal of the nondistribution constraint is to increase altruism, the mechanism’s
success is questionable. Although the IRS requires all charities to include the
nondistribution constraint in their formation documents, there is no meaningful policing of
the restriction. The responsibility of compliance falls largely upon overworked and
uninterested state attorneys general. Hansmann, supra note [__] at 873-74. (“[M]ost states
… make little or no effort to enforce [the nondistribution constraint]. As a rule, its
enforcement is placed exclusively in the hands of the state’s attorney general…. Yet in
most states neither the office of the attorney general nor any other office of the state
government devotes any appreciable amount of resources to the oversight of nonprofit
firms.”). But somewhat surprisingly, in the face of impotent policing mechanisms, the
nondistribution constraint is widely respected by tax-exempt entities. Professor Hansmann
points out that the compliance is self-imposed by the sector, suggesting that “social norms
that reinforce legal restraints on profiteering” are enforcing the nondistribution constraint
in the presence of “minimal policing.” Id at 875. And policing aside, there are, after all,
other ways of transferring organizational assets from the charity to an individual. See
discussion of salaries, infra notes [___].
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2. Prohibition of Private Inurement
Despite the nondistribution constraint, there are still many ways to
frustrate altruism by transferring value from the nonprofit organization to
individuals. Rather than boldly funneling profits to individuals, an
organization may provide value by other means. Perhaps an organization
provides access to charity-owned vehicles or allows an individual use office
space rent-free. Such a transaction would not only frustrate any ideals of
altruism, but would also render the nondistribution constraint relatively
toothless.
To confront these potential problems, the language that provides the
basis for the nondistribution constraint has been interpreted broadly. The
Code dictates that tax-exemption is available only for organizations in
which “no part of the net earnings … inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”46 This “oddly phrased and thoroughly antiquated
language” is known as the private inurement doctrine47 and is found in one
of the earliest iterations of the act exempting certain organizations from
taxes.48 This provision has far-reaching implications. The definition of
“private shareholder or individual” is notably comprehensive, and includes
any person who has a “personal and private interest in the activities of the
organization.”49 Such a definition includes the obvious candidates for
private inurement, such as officers, directors, or members, and also has been
read to include any individual who has a “close relationship” with the
organization “when he, she, or it is in a position to exercise a significant
degree of control over it.”50 As summarized by the IRS, the private
inurement prohibition seeks to proscribe situations in which a “financial
benefit represents a transfer of the organization’s financial resources to an
individual solely by virtue of the individual’s relationship with the
organization, without regard to accomplishing exempt purposes.”51
There is good reason to believe that the private inurement restriction has
its basis in altruism. This is facially evident, as the language prevents
individuals from receiving benefits from an organization. There is,
46

26 CFR 1.501(c)(3)
Bruce Hopkins, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 10th Edition (2011) at
506 (“The contemporary meaning of this statutory language is barely reflected in its literal
form.”).
48
Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement
and Excess Benefit, 19 VIRGINIA TAX REVIEW 4, 575, 590 (2000) (speaking of the private
inurement prohibition)
49
26 CFR 1.501(a)-1(c).
50
Hopkins, supra note [__] at 506.
51
Gen. Couns. Mem 38459, Cited by Hopkins, supra note [__] at 507.
47
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however, little in the way of guidance from lawmakers, as “neither
Congress, the courts, nor the [IRS] has ever taken the time to explicate the
particular categories of private inurement or state their defining
principles.”52 Although legislative intent is difficult to ascertain,53 Professor
Darryll Jones suggests that “the prohibition was intended to exclude any
‘element of personal gain,’ and to provide exemption to entities ‘in which
no man receives a scintilla of individual profit.”54 Further, the IRS has
stated that the “inurement prohibition serves to prevent anyone in a position
to do so from siphoning off any of a charity’s income or assets for personal
use.”55 This statement, clarifying the doctrine’s aim of removing the
potential for personal enrichment, is a strong indication that the private
inurement restriction’s intended goal is to support altruism.
Interestingly, unlike other rules governing activities of charities (e.g.,
lobbying56 or commercial activity), the IRS does not brook any amount of
private inurement, no matter how insubstantial. The prohibition is
absolute—any amount of private inurement is proscribed. As explained by
Professor Hopkins, “none of the income or assets of an exempt organization
subject to the private inurement doctrine may be permitted to directly or
indirectly unduly benefit an individual.”57 Thus, the intent behind the
prohibition is clear: the prevention of individuals using tax-exempt charities
for personal enrichment. Or to put it another way, “[t]he prohibition is
designed to prevent the conversion of a tax-exempt endeavor into a personal
wealth-creating endeavor. That is, the prohibition prohibits the private
taking of the entity’s wealth.”58
Similar to the nondistribution constraint, the restriction against private
inurement is structured in such a manner that individual motivations are
irrelevant. The IRS is not concerned with reasons for the private inurement;
rather, all private inurement is barred. The promotion of altruism is clear:
the more we can ensure that the assets of the tax-exempt entity are used to
engage in charitable works (rather than distributed to individuals), the more
52

Jones, supra note [__] at 592.
Id. (“The legislative debate on the [prohibition of private inurement] provides
perfunctory insight at best.”).
54
Id.
55
Ge. Couns. Mem. 39861, cited in Hopkins, supra note [__] at 507.
56
It is well-settled that 501(c)(3) organizations may engage in an insubstantial amount
of lobbying, but the reasons for the limitation are not entirely clear. For a more complete
discussion, see Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the
Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 446 (1960) (“It is not clear from the early history of
the restriction on political activities whether it evolved as a result of carefully considered
policy, or of the Treasury’s understandable desire to place outer limits around any
exemption, or on the assumption that established property law required it.”).
57
Hopkins, supra note [__] at 506 (emphasis supplied).
58
Jones, supra note [__] at 582.
53
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we have approximated altruism. In conjunction with the nondistribution
constraint, the private inurement prohibition works to limit the ability for
individuals to realize personal gain from the activities of the charity.
3. Restriction to Charitable Activities
Thus far, we’ve discussed mechanisms designed to ensure some level of
altruism in the individuals working with the organization. Together, the
nondistribution constraint and the private inurement prohibition work to
prevent organizations from funneling money and assets to individuals. But
what of the organization itself? Are there mechanisms in place to ensure
that the organizations act without self-regard?
As it happens, there are structural provisions in place that limit the
activities of charities to ensure they are operated in a certain manner. The
Code states that all charities must be “organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes.”59
Similar to the prohibition against private inurement, the plain language
of this statute suggests a strong prohibition against any activities that do not
fall under the one of these categories. After all, the statute states that the
organization must not only be organized for such purposes, but also that the
organization is “operated exclusively” for such purposes. This therefore
appears to be another mechanism to ensure some amount of altruism in our
charitable organization. However, the plain language of the statute does not
govern, and this statute has been read to permit many activities that would
not be considered altruistic.

59

The statute continues to include activities that “foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” 26
CFR 1.501(c)(3). This list finds its origins in the English Statute of Charitable Uses,
enacted in 1601. See THE STATUTE OF CHARITABLE USES, 43 ELIZ., ch 4 (1601), which
limited charitable trusts to a lengthy list of enumerated activities, including “Reliefe of the
aged impotent and poore people, … Maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and
Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universtities, …
Educacion and preferment of Orphans.” This list, being both over- and under-inclusive,
gave rise to a number of conflicting judicial pronouncements and little in the manner of
precedent. Ultimately, nearly two centuries after the enactment of the Statute of Charitable
Uses, the famous Pemsel case provided a more useful list of the appropriate activities of
charities. As set forth Pemsel, “’Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal
divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for
the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not
falling under any of the preceding heads.” Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1891
App. Cas. 531.
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B. Compromised Altruism Undermined
As the previous section showed, although the laws governing charities
ensure something well short of altruism, the regime boasts a number of
mechanisms designed to restrict the ability of individuals to use charities for
selfish or self-regarding purposes. We have, in a sense, created a tax-exempt
regime that reflects both our desire for altruism in charities and the practical
difficulties involved in ensuring actual altruism. From an individual’s
perspective, the nondistribution constraint and the private inurement
restriction prohibit charities from distributing net earnings to individuals or
enriching individuals through other means. From the entity’s perspective,
the restriction of activities to charitable purposes prevents organizations
from engaging in non-charitable activities. If we were to stop here, we
might have some sense of resigned contentment: we are not requiring
absolute altruism, but perhaps we’ve done our best. But there are a number
of exceptions that undermine these mechanisms and allow tax-exempt
entities to engage in activities that work against any reasonable definition of
altruism. Of most relevance to this Article, the Code permits charities to pay
salaries and participate in the commercial market.
1. Reasonable Salaries
As mentioned in the Introduction, charities are permitted to compensate
their employees. To many, the fact that the charities can pay salaries at all is
surprising, let alone the fact that many executives of charities have quite
handsome compensation packages. An intuitive and reasonable reading of
the statutory private inurement prohibition (“no part of the net earnings …
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”)60 suggests
that a charity cannot provide any compensation. Indeed, it is hard to
conceive of a salary as anything other than giving a portion of the “net
earnings” of a charity to a “private … individual.” But as with most aspects
of the law governing charities, the plain meaning of the Code is not
controlling, and charities may pay salaries to employees to the extent that
the salaries are reasonable.61
The permissibility of salaries suggests that policymakers are not
interested in approximating altruism through the laws governing charities.
60

26 CFR 1.501(c)(3).
Hopkins, supra note [___] at 513 ( “A tax-exempt organization … can, of course,
make ordinary and necessary expenditures in furtherance of its operations without
forfeiting its exempt status. This includes the payment of compensation for services
rendered, whether to an employee or to a vendor, consultant, or other independent
contractor.”).
61
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Indeed, from the perspective of salaries, there is some evidence suggesting
that altruism is neither intended nor desired. In terms of legislative history,
lawmakers noted that those working for charities “need not necessarily
accept reduced compensation merely because he or she renders services to a
tax-exempt, as opposed to a taxable, organization.”62 This legislative history
serves as evidence against the altruism presumption: the lawmakers imply
that charity salaries are no different from for-profit salaries. Indeed, this
statement appears to be an absolute refutation against the assumption that
we prefer our charities to be as altruistic as possible. This is echoed in case
law, where courts have repeatedly refused to require any selflessness on the
part of a charity’s employees. As one court noted, the law “places no duty
on individuals operating charitable organizations to donate their services;
they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts.”63
We should, however, be careful not to draw too many conclusions from
these statements. In keeping with the relatively haphazard theoretical
foundation of almost all charity law, the provision of reasonable salaries is
founded on ill-defined policy justifications. As an exception to the private
inurement prohibition, itself an “elusive, elastic, and evolving theory rather
than a safely articulated standard,”64 the fact that charities may pay salaries
enjoys virtually no theoretical justification. Further, although the legislative
history and some courts suggest that salaries for charities’ employees ought
to receive no extra scrutiny, the fact remains that salaries paid by charities
are not unrestricted. Salaries paid by charities must be reasonable, both in
absolute amount (as compared to other organizations)65 and in relation to
the assets of the organization.66 This is in sharp contrast to salaries paid by
for-profit organizations, which are under no such limitations.67
62

H. Rep. 104-506, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, note 3 (1976).
World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 969 (1983).
64
See Jones, supra note [___] at 581.
65
Hopkins, supra note [___] at 514.
66
Id. at 514-15. (The test for reasonableness is not settled. Some courts apply a
multifactor test, some apply an independent investor test, and some apply a combination of
the two. “The factors commonly applied … to ascertain the reasonableness of
compensation are: The levels of compensation paid by similar organizations (tax-exempt
and taxable) for functionally comparable positions, with emphasis on comparable entities
in the same community or region; the need of the organization for the services of the
individual whose compensation is being evaluated; the individual’s background, education,
training, experience, and responsibilities; whether the compensation resulted from arms’
length bargaining …; the size and complexity of the organization…; the individual’s prior
compensation arrangement; the individual’s performance; the relationship of the
individual’s compensation to that paid to other employees of the same organization;
whether there has been a sharp increase in the individual’s compensation (a spike) from
one year to the next; and the amount of time the individual devotes to the position.”).
67
Indeed, a for-profit company may pay as much as it likes to its employees. There is
63
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In the face of such mixed signals, it is difficult to suss out a coherent
message. The private inurement restriction certainly suggests a preference
for altruism by severely limiting the ability of individuals to personally
benefit from the assets of a charity. However, this effort is undermined by
the ability of charities to pay salaries. While the ability of charities to pay
salaries suggests a regime that is not concerned with altruistic ideals, this
conclusion is belied by the fact that those salaries are restricted. Regardless
of the intent and the lack of coherence, the permissibility of salaries
certainly diminishes any attempts to require or encourage altruism in
charities.
2. Commercial Activity
To the extent it is surprising that charities pay salaries, it must be utterly
shocking that charities may engage in commerce. An act of commerce, a
quid pro quo exchange, may very well be the absolute antithesis of altruism.
If a quintessential altruistic act is defined as “[w]hatever is given … free
from the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or
selfish,”68 then a commercial transaction in which one party exchanges
money for the services or goods of another certainly does not qualify as
altruism. Indeed, if one is giving something in exchange for something else,
one wonders if anything is “given” at all. But no matter how
counterintuitive, it is becoming increasingly common for charities to engage
in commercial activity.
It is important to note that the plain language of the Code does not
appear to permit any commercial activity by charities. Section 501(c)(3) of
the Code clearly states that tax-exemption is only permitted for
organizations “organized and operated exclusively” for a defined charitable
purpose.69 As Professor John Colombo notes, although it this appears that
the Code “states in no uncertain terms” that a charity must restrict its
activity to charitable purposes, therefore not permitting any commercial
activity, “[t]his section … has almost never been interpreted literally.”70
The IRS has stretched the definition of what, precisely, constitutes activities
that prove the charity is “operated exclusively” for charitable purposes,
holding that “exclusively” means something akin to “mostly.” So long as
“not more than an insubstantial part” of the charity’s activities is engaged in
no requirement that salaries be “reasonable.” One need only look at the salaries of CEOs of
publicly traded companies to learn that reasonableness is not in the discussion.
68
See discussion infra notes [___]
69
26 CFR 1.501(c)(3). (emphasis supplied)
70
John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV 487, 496 (2002).
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something other than one of the enumerated charitable purposes, the charity
is deemed to be operated “exclusively” for charitable purposes.71 The
practical implications of this interpretation is that charities may engage in
some commercial activities, and, for over nearly a century, courts and the
IRS have crafted several tests to determine how much and what types of
commercial activities are appropriate for charitable organizations.72 Further,
a charity may engage in unlimited amounts of commercial activity if such
activity is related to the charity’s exempt purpose.73
The murky nature of the test that purports to identify what, precisely,
constitutes commercial activity that is related to the charity’s purpose, is not
within the scope of this paper. However, it is important to know the policy
considerations that undergird the limitation of commercial activities by
charities. While there are a number of concerns, including the fact that
commercial activities divert attention from charitable activities,74 a question
of whether a charity’s commercial activity creates market inefficiencies,75
and the fear that a charity’s assets might be exposed to liabilities of the
commercial activity,76 this Article will restrict the discussion to what
Professor Colombo labeled the “traditional” policy concerns: the twin fears
of unfair competition and the erosion of the corporate tax base.
To state the first traditional policy concern bluntly, there is a fear that
tax-exempt organizations that engage in commercial activity might have an
unfair competitive advantage over for-profit actors because charities do not

71

See Hopkins, supra note [___].
For a complete discusson of the history of commercial activity by 501(c)(3)
organizations, see Id.
73
A charity may also engage in a certain amount of commercial activity that is
unrelated to its charitable purpose so long as the charity pays taxes on any revenues
generated through such activities. This taxable revenue is known as unrelated business
income, and if a charity incurs too much, then the charity jeopardizes its 501(c)(3) status.
However, the test for what, precisely, constitutes an amount of unrelated business income
that would jeopardize an organization’s tax-exempt status is not entirely clear. And like
many of the restrictions on tax-exempt entities, the justification for the imposition of tax on
unrelated business income is a bit muddled.
74
See Colombo supra note [___] at 534. Professor Colombo calls this the “diversion
problem,” and explains that “[t]his argument views commercial activity by nonprofits as
inherently bad because it diverts the attention of managers and resources away from the
core charitable mission and core charitable outputs.”
75
See Id. at 538 “[T]hese issues revolve around whether an exempt charity’s operation
of a commercial activity creates inefficiencies in the capital markets or the distribution of
goods and services that would not result from competition by for-profits only or if
nonprofits concentrated their resources solely on production of charitable outputs.”
76
Id. at 544 “There certainly is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that charitable
assets, the creation of which has been at least partially subsidized by tax-exemption, are not
squandered in the operation of noncharitable businesses.”
72
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have to pay taxes.77 The fear is that charities may use the fact that they are
not subject to taxes to engage in predatory pricing. In other words, once a
charity is relieved of the burden of paying taxes on a commercial activity, it
may price its goods or services lower than for-profit entities, thereby
engaging in unfair competition. In addition to predatory pricing, another
example of potential unfair competition by charities is “subsidized market
expansion,” or “the possibility that an exempt organization will unfairly
expand market share by using its tax savings to reinvest in its commercial
activity, thus expanding the activity with a source of money (tax exemption)
unavailable to nonexempt for-profit competitors.”78 Although many
commentators have noted that there is no evidence that charities engage in
either predatory pricing or subsidized market expansion,79 the fear of unfair
competition remains one of the core reasons for the imposition of tax on the
commercial activity of charities.
In addition to the fear of unfair competition, the other traditional policy
concern regarding charities engaging in commerce is the effect on the tax
base. As noted in the Introduction, the nonprofit sector makes up a
significant portion of the American economy. Thus, there is a serious
concern that our country is foregoing substantial revenues by bestowing
tax-exemption on charities. For this reason, the commercial activities of
charities that are unrelated to the entity’s charitable purpose are subject to
taxes. This is known as the unrelated business income tax. Removing
potential income from the tax base was a “major concern” of Congress in
imposing a tax on unrelated business income.80 Discussing the limits of
charitable organizations engaging in commercial activity is a well-worn
territory,81 not the least of which because of the impact it would have on the
77

Id. at 530 “An example would be a sort of ‘predatory pricing’ in which an exempt
organization prices its product below its competitors because it does not have to recoup the
costs of taxation.”
78
Id. at 530.
79
Id. at 530 “In fact, legal academics and economists who have examined the issue
have reached an almost remarkable consensus that unfair competition in the form of
predatory pricing or predatory market expansion simply is not a serious policy concern.”
Citing, Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale L. J. 299 (1976), Henry Hansmann, Unfair Competition
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 Va L. Rev. 605 (1989), William A. Klein,
Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 13 (1972), Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan L. Rev. 1017 (1982), and
Richard Steinberg, “Unfair” Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 Nat’l Tax J.
351 (1991). Professor Colombo concludes that “even though unfair competition was the
primary rationale for enacting the UBIT, it in fact may not be a very serious policy concern
in practice.”
80
Id. at 532.
81
See J. Bennett and G. Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Commercial
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tax base. Indeed, “it is not overly cynical to suggest that some members of
Congress would be willing to cede parts of the formerly exempt nonprofit
sector to for-profit firms in return for the tribute of additional tax
revenue.”82
Both of the traditional concerns regarding commercial activity by
charities—unfair competition and the shrinking tax base—suggest
significant costs of charitable organizations engaging in for-profit activity.
Although there is little evidence to suggest that charities engage in any
unfair competitive activities, the potential for abuse certainly exists. And
unfair competition aside, the shrinking tax base is of undeniable
significance.
3. An Eroding Altruism
Thus, while several aspects of the tax-exempt regime appear to have
roots in approximating altruism, with several mechanisms restricting
individuals from taking advantage of charitable assets, these prohibitions
are undermined by compromises that permit charities to pay salaries and
engage in commercial activity. There are certainly good arguments to
permit such activities. Perhaps charities must pay salaries to entice qualified
individuals to leave the promised riches of the private market. And perhaps
the commercial activities of charities serve to bolster the limited assets
necessary to engage in good works. But the fact remains that neither salaries
nor commercial activity are consistent with any reasonable conception of
altruism. We therefore have a regime that bestows charitable status upon
entities that engage in activities that most members of the public would
deem relatively uncharitable.
The ability for entities to pay salaries and engage in commercial
activities gives rise to the possibility of abuse. An immoral individual might
take advantage of this situation by approving an undeserved salary or
engaging in unfair competition. To ensure that charitable assets are not
misappropriated in the form of unreasonable salaries, innocent actors in the
private market are protected from unfair competition, and the nation’s tax
base is as robust as possible, it is in our best interest to ensure that taxexemption is awarded only to deserving entities and not those actors with
Nonprofit Issue, TAX NOTES, September 14, 1987, 1095-1098, arguing, in part, that
organizations that receive more than 50% of their revenue from commercial activity should
not be deemed tax-exempt. Interesting for purposes of this Article, Bennett and Rudney
also argue that any commercial activity which is priced significantly below cost to targeted
individuals should not be considered commercial. See also, Colombo and Hall, supra note
[___], arguing that contributions should make up 1/3 of the gross revenue of charities.
82
See Atkinson, supra note [___] at 507-08.
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ill-intent. Given the severity of the stakes, the next section’s examination of
the current process for determining tax-exempt status will prove to be
wholly disappointing.
II. HOW WE DETERMINE CHARITABLE STATUS
In the not-too-distant past, a common inquiry to the IRS’s Exempt
Organization division was, “Have you reviewed my tax-exempt application
yet?” In fact, the question was so frequent that the IRS created a webpage
that posted the average age of pending tax-exempt applications and an
estimated wait time for applicants to expect a decision. For nonprofit
professionals, attorneys representing charities, and anxious leaders of
nonprofits awaiting their determination letter, a visit to the IRS’s Where’s
My Exemption Application? website was a weekly occurrence.
The information provided by the Where’s My Exemption Application
website was minimal, but precious. Due to increasingly severe budget cuts,
the IRS was simply unable to review tax-exempt applications in a timely
manner.83 The Where’s My Exemption Application website was the only
way for would-be charities to get an idea of when they might learn the
outcome of their tax-exempt application. For example, a visitor to the
website in July 2014 would see the following notice: “The average age of
our pending application inventory now is October 2013.”84 This meant that
applicants who had submitted an application approximately ten months
prior were still waiting for the IRS to issue a determination on their taxexempt status.85 If ten months were not alarming enough, it is important to
note that this is an average age, and there were certainly many applications
that were submitted much earlier than October.86 But however meager or
dispiriting, the Where’s My Exemption Application website was the best
way for aspiring charities to check on the status of their applications.
Today is much different. If you go to the IRS’s Where’s My Exemption
Application website today, you get a very different message. Rather than a
83

Yin, supra note [___] at 268. (“The reasons for this change are pretty clear. The IRS
has accumulated a massive backlog of applications, causing unacceptable delays in their
processing, and it is now under severe budgetary constraints, with no relief in sight.”)
84
“IRS Announces Shorter, Faster Application For Some Tax Exempt Organizations”,
Forbes, July 1, 2014, available at www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/07/01/irsannounces-shorter-faster-application-for-some-tax-exempt-organizations/.
85
Id. “Yes, that does mean that ten months–or about 300 days–after an initial
application, organizations are still waiting to hear about tax-exempt status. That kind of
wait time is ridiculous not only for tax exempt organizations but for individuals who wish
to support them.”
86
As anecdotal evidence, one of my clients waited for over two years before receiving
the IRS determination letter on a tax-exempt application.
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notice of the average age of the current application backlog, visitors are
greeted with a cheerful assertion that the “inventory of applications is
current.”87 As if this boast was not enough, the IRS appears confident that it
will not fall behind again. So confident, in fact, that the IRS no longer keeps
track of the average age of pending applications and has effectively shut
down the Where’s My Exemption Application? website.88
What accounts for this newfound efficiency? Did the IRS suddenly hire
more employees to review applications?89 Did it reallocate resources to
address the backlog? Did it implement a more efficient review process?
The answer is that the IRS adopted a streamlined application process for
smaller charities. To combat the application process’s inefficiency and
address the delays, the IRS determined that it was inappropriate to have all
charities undergo the “same lengthy application process” regardless of
whether the charity was “a small soccer or gardening club or a major
research organization.”90 Thus, the Form 1023-EZ was born in the summer
of 2014.
In place of the familiar Form 1023, a relative behemoth of a document
that boasted a 26-page length (before accounting for exhibits and
attachments), the Form 1023-EZ is a three-page online application
consisting primarily of attestations and questions that require little more
than a simple “yes” or “no.” The Form 1023-EZ supplemented a tax-exempt
application process that has persisted for over half a century,91 providing a
streamlined and user-friendly application for entities that met certain asset92
87

Where’s My Exemption Application, available at www.irs.gov/Charities-&-NonProfits/Charitable-Organizations/Where's-My-Application.
88
The IRS has “retired the monthly date for the average age of pending applications.”
See Where’s My Application, available at
89
This is certainly not the case, as budget cuts have forced the IRS to lay-off a
frighteningly high number of employees.	
  “Between 2010, the year before Republicans took
control of the House of Representatives, and 2014, the I.R.S. budget dropped by nearly $2
billion in real terms, or nearly 15 percent. That has forced it to shed about 5,000 high-level
enforcement positions out of about 23,000, according to the agency.” Noam Scheiber and
Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, a Private Tax System That Saves Them Billions, NY
Times, December 29, 2015.
90
IRS Press Release, July 1, 2014, New 1023-EZ Form Makes Applying for 501(c)(3)
Tax-Exempt
Status
Easier;
Most
Charities
Qualify,
available
at
https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/New-1023-EZ-Form-Makes-Applying-for-501c3TaxExempt-Status-Easier-Most-Charities-Qualify (IRS Press Release).
91
Viswanathan, Manoj (2014), Form 1023-EZ and the Streamlined Process for the
Federal Income Tax Exemption: Is the IRS Slashing Red Tape or Opening Pandora's Box?,
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online: Vol. 163, Article 4 at 89,
available
at:
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol163/iss1/4
(citing James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 558-59 (2010)).
92
Entities with more than $250,000 in total assets may not use the Form 1023-EZ. See
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and gross receipt93 requirements.
If the sole goal was to address inefficiencies in the tax-exempt
application process, the Form 1023-EZ was a success. The backlog of taxexempt applications has been addressed and the Where’s My Exemption
Application website has been rendered superfluous. But despite this success,
the Form 1023-EZ is not without its critics. Indeed, the response to the
Form 1023-EZ has been loud and mostly negative. Professor George Yin,
one of the first legal academics to address the streamlined application,
warned that the Form 1023-EZ paved the way for “insincere applicants” to
“obtain tax-deductible contributions for all manner of nonqualifying
activities and expenses.”94 Although Professor Yin concedes that the IRS is
facing a severe resource shortfall, he ultimately concludes that the decision
to permit a streamlined application process represents a “misallocation and
general misuse of scarce resources available to ensure compliance in the
exempt organization area.”95
The critics of the Form 1023-EZ argue that the streamlined process fails
to educate the applicants and does not provide enough information for the
IRS to gauge the applicant’s worthiness.
A. The Form 1023 vs. The Form 1023-EZ
1. The Form 1023
Prior to the Form 1023-EZ, almost all charitable organizations that
hoped to obtain tax-exempt status were required to complete the Form
1023. There were a few exceptions to this requirement, including churches
and very small entities (under $5,000 in gross receipts), but the vast
majority of charitable entities were required to complete the Form 1023.
The Form 1023 was initially introduced in 1951, largely spurred on by the
increased scrutiny of tax-exempt organizations under The Revenue Act of
1950.
Since its introduction, the Form 1023 has undergone several revisions.
The first incarnation of the Form 1023 was four pages in length, and it
requested information concerning the applicant’s charitable purpose,
activities of the organization, sources of revenue, and lobbying. It also
required applicants to provide certain financial information and a copy of
Form 1023-EZ Worksheet.
93
Entities that have had more than $50,000 in gross receipts in any of the previous
three years or expect more than $50,000 in any the next three years may not use the Form
1023-EZ. See Form 1023-EZ Worksheet.
94
Yin, supra note [__] at 269.
95
Id. at 267.
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the organization’s bylaws and formation documents. Since its first
incarnation, the Form 1023 has evolved into a much more searching and
fulsome document.96 The modern Form 1023’s main section is twelve pages
long, and the application includes 14 additional pages of schedules that are
required for certain organizations.97 The instructions on how to complete
the Form 1023 are 38 pages long, and the application requires a number of
attachments. With all attachments, the completed Form 1023 proves to be a
quite a lengthy document. In addition to requiring the organization to
submit a copy of its formation documents98 and bylaws,99 the Form 1023
also requires submission of the names and biographies of the initial
members of the board of directors,100 the salaries of the five highest paid
employees,101 and several years’ worth of pro forma financial statements.102
These requests, however, represent a relatively small percentage of most
completed Form 1023s. The bulk of a completed application is generally in
response to the prompt in Part IV of the Form 1023. This section requires a
narrative description of the organization’s activities, which “[d]escribe[s]
completely and in detail [the organization’s] past, present, and planned
activities.”103
The Part IV narrative is where the applicant organization makes the case
that it deserves tax-exempt status. The narrative is the opportunity for the
applicant to “fully describe all of the activities in which it expects to
engage, including standards, criteria, procedures, or other means adopted or
96

Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities (ACT), page 6, June
6, 2012, available at http://martinlegalhelp.com/docs/EO_ACT_Report-Final-June2012.pdf
(“Over the years, the form expanded both the scope and depth of the questions.”).
97
The schedules apply to the following organizations:
Schedule A
Schedule B
Schedule C
Schedule D
Schedule E
Schedule F
Schedule G
Schedule H

Churches
Schools, Colleges, and Universities
Hospitals and Medical Research Organizations
Section 509(a) Supporting Organizations
Organizations Not Filing Form 1023 Within 27 Months of Formation
Homes for the Elderly or Handicapped and Low-Income Housing
Successors to Other Organizations
Organizations Providing Scholarships, Fellowships, Educations
Loans, or Other Educational Grants to Individuals and Private
Foundations Requesting Advance Approval of Individual Grant
Procedures

98

See Form 1023 Checklist, Form 1023
See Form 1023, Part II.5.
100
See Form 1023, Part V.3a.
101
See Form 1023, Part V.b.
102
See Form 1023, Part IX.
103
Form 1023 instructions, page 8.
99
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planned for carrying out the [charitable] activities.”104 Although the IRS
ultimately approves most Form 1023 tax-exempt applications, it reserves
the right to deny tax-exempt status if the application does not present a
“meaningful explanation of [the organization’s] activities,” or if the
application “provides only general information, lacks sufficient detail, does
not fully describe the organization’s programs, [or] is otherwise vague.”105
The Part IV narrative is the best opportunity for applicants to convince the
IRS that the organization’s activities are appropriately charitable to justify
tax-exempt status.
Once you combine the form itself, the required attachments, and the Part
IV narrative, a properly completed Form 1023 is an impressive document.
According to a private group that provides guidance on completing the
Form 1023, “a typical application package is between 50-100 pages of
material.”106
2. The Form 1023-EZ: “A radical change to a decades-old process”107
It is difficult to imagine how the Form 1023-EZ could be more different
from the Form 1023. In place of the Form 1023’s rather impressive 26-page
length, the Form 1023-EZ boasts no more than three pages. And as the
following section explains, describing the form as “three pages” might
overstate the substance of the actual form.
Part I of the Form 1023-EZ elicits mostly factual information about the
organization. This includes the name and contact information of the
organization, and the names and addresses of the officers and directors.
Interestingly, there is room for only five entries in the officers and directors
section, and the instructions tell applicants not to bother listing more than
five individuals.108 Thus, it is likely that some members of the board of
104

See Hopkins, supra note [__] at 798.
Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
https://www.501c3.org/frequently-asked-questions/how-long-does-it-take-tocomplete-form-1023/
107
Viswanathan, supra note [__] at 89.
108
According to the instructions to the Form 1023-EZ, if an organization has “more
than five [officers, directors, or trustees], list only five in the [following] order below.
1. President or chief executive officer or chief operating officer.
2. Treasurer or chief financial officer.
3. Chairperson of the governing body.
4. Any officers, directors, and trustees who are substantial contributors (not
already listed above).
5. Any other officers, directors, and trustees who are related to a substantial
contributor (not already listed above).
6. Voting members of the governing body (not already listed above).
7. Officers (not already listed above).”
105
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directors will not appear on an organization’s tax-exempt application.
Part II of the Form 1023-EZ, consisting of seven questions, appears to
have two functions: (i) information gathering similar to Part I and (ii)
soliciting attestations. The information gathering section elicits the state of
formation for the applicant and the organization’s date of formation, while
Part II requires a number of attestations that the applicant has appropriate
provisions in its organizing documents, including a provision that limits the
organization to charitable activities and a provision that ensures appropriate
distribution of assets upon dissolution.
Part III of the Form 1023-EZ also gathers information, including the
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Code and the category of charitable
work for which the organization is organized. Part III also requires the
applicant to answer eight “yes” or “no” questions regarding the entity’s
plans to influence legislation, pay salaries to insiders, pay funds to
individuals, work with foreign organizations, engage in insider transactions,
incur unrelated business income in excess of $1,000, engage in gaming
activities, or provide disaster relief.109
Part IV of the Form 1023-EZ is no more than the applicant’s declaration
of its intent to operate as either a public charity or a private foundation.
Depending on the applicant’s selection, the form requires an appropriate
attestation. For example, if the organization claims to qualify as a public
charity under Section 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), it must attest that it
either receives at least one-third of its support from contributions from the
general public, or meets the 10 percent facts and circumstances test.110 Part
V of the Form 1023-EZ is irrelevant for first-time applicants,111 and Part VI
is a signature.
As this section and the immediately preceding section make clear, the
differences between the Form 1023 and the Form 1023-EZ are substantial.
The chart below illustrates the major differences between the Form 1023
and the Form 1023-EZ:
Requirement
Organizational documents
must limit activities to
charitable purposes

Form 1023
Requires copies of the
organizational documents (the
articles of incorporation and
bylaws) and an indication of the
location of such provisions.
Form 1023, Part III, line 1

Form 1023-EZ
Requires attestation.
Form 1023-EZ, Part II,
line 5

109

See Form 1023-EZ, Part III, lines 4-11.
See Form 1023-EZ, Part IV, line 1a.
111
See Form 1023-EZ, Part V, which instructs the applicant to complete the section
only if the applicant is seeking reinstatement.
110
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Organizational document
must not permit
engagement in substantial
non-exempt activities
Organizational document
must have appropriate
dissolution provision
Compensation

Requires copy of organizational
documents and an indication of
the location of such provisions.
Form 1023, Part III, line 1
Requires copy of organizational
documents and an indication of
the location of such provisions.
Form 1023, Part III, line 2
Requires list of five highest paid
officers, directors, trustees,
employees, and independent
contractors and the amount of
compensation for each.112 Form
1023, Part V

Description of
organizational activities

Part IV narrative required. Form
1023, Part IV

Conflicts of interest

Disclosure of related parties and
potential conflicts of interest
required. A conflicts of interest
policy, if in place, must be
submitted. If organization has
any contracts or arrangements
with an insider, it must be
disclosed. Form 1023, Part V
If a close connection with
another organization exists, the
applicant must explain the
relationship. Form 1023, Part
VIII, line 15
Requires disclosure of basic
financial information for each
year in existence and as many as
four years of estimated finances.
Form 1023, Part IX

Close connection with
other organization

Financial Data

[18-Oct-16
Requires attestation.
Form 1023-EZ, Part II,
line 6
Requires attestation.
Form 1023-EZ, Part II,
line 7
Asks a yes or no question
regarding compensation
for officers, directors, and
trustees (not employees or
independent contractors).
Form 1023-EZ, Part III,
line 5
No narrative required;
attestation as to charitable
activities. Form 1023-EZ,
Part II, lines 5 and 6
Requires attestation.
Form 1023-EZ, Part III,
line 8

No disclosure required

No disclosure required

The ultimate result is a significantly lighter burden on the applicant
organization. According to IRS estimates, applicants should expect to spend
about 19 hours to complete the Form 1023-EZ.113 While 19 hours may
112

Please note that the applicant does not need to list this information for employees
and independent contractors if the salary is less than $50,000 per year.
113
See Form 1023-EZ Instructions, page 10. This includes 10 hours and 2 minutes of
recordkeeping, 2 hours and 30 minutes of learning about the law or the form, five hours
and thirty-three minutes to prepare the form, and 48 minutes for copying, assembling, and
sending the form to the IRS. Please note, however, that critics contend that it may not even
take this long. Delaney: “I could easily see many applicants spending as little as an hour or
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appear to be an attractively short amount of time, the estimate is even more
impressive when one considers that the IRS estimates that applicants will
spend 105 hours completing the Form 1023.114 Needless to say, an
estimated difference of over two full 40-hour weeks is significant. Indeed, it
is difficult to conceive of a more dramatic difference in tax-exempt
applications. The Form 1023-EZ eschews many requirements that long-time
nonprofit professionals may find jarring. Most notably, the Form 1023-EZ
does not require a narrative description defending the charitable nature of
the organization’s activities, any financial data, or any actual copies of the
organizational documents. According to Professor Manoj Viswanathan,
such changes represent nothing less than a “radical change to a decades-old
process.”115
B. Why The Streamlined Process Fails
The arguments against the Form 1023-EZ were swift and multifaceted.
While commentators managed to attack virtually every aspect of the new
application, the criticisms may accurately be categorized as charges that the
Form 1023-EZ lacks either (i) the educational component of the Form 1023
that prepared applicants for proper operation as a charitable organization or
(ii) the substantive rigor to permit the IRS to properly assess applicants,
thereby betraying the public’s trust. This section will describe the crux of
each of these arguments.
1. The Form 1023-EZ Fails the Educational Role
The first category of criticisms highlights the fact that the traditional
Form 1023 plays a significant role in educating applicants on the proper
activities and conduct of charitable organizations. By requiring the
applicants to engage in, for example, the laborious process of completing
the Part IV narrative, the organization is forced to consider each of the
organization’s past, present, and planned activities in a careful and critical
manner. Not only does the Form 1023 request a description of the activities,
but it also asks the organization to explain how the activity furthers the
organization’s exempt purpose.116 In theory, this requires a critical
evaluation of each of the applicant’s activities to determine the specific
so – not because they deliberately intend to skirt the law, but because they simply don’t
know or understand what they are required to certify.” Delaney letter p. 3
114
This omits “the time needed to submit any required schedules.” See Viswanathan,
footnote 2
115
Viswanathan, supra note [__] at 89.
116
Form 1023 Instructions, p 8.
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activity’s charitable aims. As one critic of the Form 1023-EZ noted
[h]aving gone through the [Form 1023] application process
with a museum I helped start, we were put through the ringer
by the IRS which to some extent forced us to think through
our plans (mission, vision, intent, how we would operate,
etc.) ultimately, I believe, making us stronger. 117
In addition to the Part IV narrative, the organization is also asked to provide
financial information and projected financial information, requiring a
thoughtful applicant to consider how much projects will cost and how the
organization will raise such funds.118
Professor Bruce Hopkins suggests the rigor involved in completing the
Form 1023 is by design. The Form 1023 prompts were drafted to inspire
thoughtful responses by the applicant organization. As Professor Hopkins
notes,
[t]he proper preparation of [a Form 1023] involves far more
than merely responding to the questions on a government
form. It is a process not unlike the preparation of a
prospectus for a business in conformity with securities law
requirements. Every statement made in the application should
be carefully considered…. Organizations that are entitled to
tax-exempt status have been denied recognition of exemption
by the IRS, or at least have cause the process of gaining the
recognition to be more protracted, because of unartful
phraseologies in the application that motivated the agency to
muster a case that the organization did not qualify for
exemption.119
To highlight this concern, the National Council of Nonprofits, in a letter
criticizing the Form 1023-EZ, stresses that the streamlined process will rob
future applicants of the educational component of the full Form 1023.120
As the previous section made clear, the Form 1023-EZ contains no
requirements akin to either the part IV narrative or the required financial
projections of the Form 1023. Indeed, the apparent simplicity of the Form
117

Delaney letter, p 3.
Form 1023 instructions, Part IX.
119
Hopkins, supra note [___] at 802.
120
Council Letter page 9. The concerns set forth in the National Council for
Nonprofit’s letter were addressed point by point by Professor Manaj Vaswanathan. See
Viswanathan, supra note [___] at 96-99.
118
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1023-EZ suggests that such searching self-assessment might not be
necessary. Describing a hypothetical group of applicants as “sincere but not
well advised,” Professor Yin imagines such applicants as they
pore over the few sentences in the instructions summarizing
the private inurement and benefit doctrines and other familiar
parts of the law. How are they, working on their own, going
to complete their required attestations?121
Professor Yin’s concern is that the Form 1023-EZ does not provide the
applicant with enough educational material to make an informed attestation.
In fact, Professor Yin seems to suggest that one of the benefits of the
complexity of the Form 1023 is that its difficulty had a positive outcome: it
encouraged applicants to seek legal advice. The National Council for
Nonprofit’s letter echoes this sentiment, noting that although the process
under the Form 1023 is cumbersome, “it requires effort and energy and
pushed away those that are not prepared…. The [Form 1023] is
overwhelming and is discouraging to some, but also a deterrent to those
with only half-baked plans and ideas.”122
2. The Form 1023-EZ Does Not Provide the IRS With Enough
Information to Adequately Assess Applicants
In addition to the concern of the Form 1023-EZ’s lack of an educational
component, many critics have expressed concerns that the streamlined
application does not elicit enough information. This relative lack of
information gathering in the Form 1023-EZ has been derisively referred to
as tax-exempt application equivalent of “don’t ask, don’t tell.”123 Critics are
concerned that this lack of information gathering paves the way for the IRS
to award tax-exempt status to entities that should not qualify. Or worse, the
lack of information gathering may provide the means for fraud.
The critics’ fears may be well-founded. At least one study supports the
notion that the Form 1023-EZ may result in the IRS awarding tax-exempt
status to unfit entities. Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate,124
engaged a study with the IRS that implemented additional requirements for
121

Yin, supra note [__] at 268.
Council letter, p. 2-3.
123
NY Times, Patricia Cohen, I.R.S. Shortcut to Tax-Exempt Status is Under Fire,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/business/irs-shortcut-to-tax-exemptstatus-is-under-fire.html. April 8, 2015.
124
The National Taxpayer Advocate is an independent organization within the IRS that
serves as an advocate for taxpayers who are experiencing delays or are suffering economic
harm.
122
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411 organizations that submitted a Form 1023-EZ.125 Of these
organizations, the IRS requested additional information, including “the
organizing document of past, present, and future activities; revenues and
expenses; and a detailed description of any transactions with donors or
related entities.”126 In other words, these organizations were asked to
provide much of the information they would have been required to submit
under the traditional Form 1023. After review of this additional
information, only 73% of the 411 applications were ultimately granted
501(c)(3) status. This is in contrast to the 95% of all Form 1023-EZ
applicants that ultimately receive 501(c)(3) status.127 As Jill MacNabb, an
advisor to the National Taxpayer Advocate, noted, “there’s a significant
difference in the approval rate of a [Form] 1023-EZ just as it is and the
approval rate when you ask for some very basic information.”128 To many,
these results are disturbing, as it strongly suggests that the IRS is providing
tax-exempt status to entities that would not have qualified had they been
required to submit the Form 1023. Or in the words of the National Taxpayer
Advocate, the IRS granted 501(c)(3) status to “applications it would have
rejected had the applications been subject to the slightest scrutiny.”129
Another study by the Taxpayer Advocate Service provides more reason
for concern. The Taxpayer Advocate Service set out to review the
organizational documents of some entities that received 501(c)(3) status
through the Form 1023-EZ to determine if the documents complied with
IRS’s organizational test, which requires a charitable organization to (i)
limit its purpose to one or more exempt purpose, (ii) not expressly empower
the organization to engage (other than insubstantially) activities which are
not in furtherance of such purpose(s), and (iii) ensure that assets are
properly distributed upon dissolution.130 Under the Form 1023-EZ,
applicants simply attest that the organizational documents contain such a
restriction. Under the Form 1023, the applicants must not only provide
copies of the organizational documents, but also indicate precisely where
125

See “The IRS Approves Many Applications for Tax-Exempt Status Almost
Automatically,
Often
Based
on
Insufficient
Information”
available
at
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016JRC/Area_of_Focus_8_Insufficient_Information_for_Tax_Exempt_Status.pdf
126
See Id. at 73.
127
Id.
128
Tax Notes, October 5, 2015 “Taxpayer Advocate Official Concerned About EO
Short Form.”
129
Id. at 74.
130
See https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/CharitableOrganizations/Organizational-Test-Internal-Revenue-Code-Section-501(c)(3). Note that
organizations in some states can meet the dissolution requirement without a specific
provision. The review took this factor into account.
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the provisions appear in such documents.131 Of the 13 entities reviewed,132
only three organizations met the organizational test.133 While a pool of 13
applications certainly does not provide a representative sample, the fact that
less than a quarter of the organizations had the required provisions is
troubling.
To say that the Form 1023-EZ does not provide the information that the
IRS needs to assess applicants should be alarming enough. However, some
critics suggest that the IRS is engaging in virtually no assessment. Citing a
“high-ranking official,” Professor Yin proffers that, with the Form 1023EZ, “the IRS has effectively created a self-certification process to obtain
(c)(3) status.134 Professor Yin continues to state that the IRS has nothing to
“screen and analyze” because the Form 1023-EZ is “a series of completely
opaque attestations.”135
The concern that the IRS is awarding tax-exempt status to unworthy
applicants is certainly alarming. However, it is somewhat mitigated by the
fact that these mistakes are, presumably, unintentional. One might
reasonably assume that an organization would not intentionally leave out a
required provision in its charter documents in order to either engage in noncharitable activity or dissolve and distribute assets in contravention of
501(c)(3) requirements. However, critics maintain that the Form 1023-EZ
may open the door to more insidious actors. Such critics are concerned that
the lack of rigor in the Form 1023-EZ will make “it easier for ‘scam’
charities to obtain tax-exempt status,” and the streamlines application shifts
“IRS oversight obligations onto the public, the funding community, and
state charity regulators.”136 Although sympathetic to the notion that the
“long-established Form 1023 and application process need review and
streamlining,”137 the National Council of Nonprofits138 also expressed
“serious concerns” about the form, warning that potential “bad actors will
… opt to use the EZ express-lane approval process to avoid the
transparency mandate that is integral to the current Form 1023 application
131

See Form 1023, part III.
The small number of applicants reviewed is because the inquiry was limited to
those states that provide organizational documents free of charge.
133
The National Taxpayer Advocate interprets that this proves “there were
organizations that have been approved that if we had just simply asked four questions we
would not have approved them,” Tax Notes, April 27, 2015, “Olson: Exemption Applicants
Are Being Wrongly Approved.”
134
Yin, supra note [__] at 267-68, citing Fred Stokeld et al, “IRS Hearing on EO
guidance Expected in Spring,” Tax Notes, March 10, 2014, p. 1078.
135
Id. at 269
136
GAO Report, supra note [__] at 32.
137
Council Letter, supra note [__] at 1.
138
Viswanathan, supra note [__] at 95 (The National Council of Nonprofits represents
the “largest network of nonprofits in the country”).
132
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process.”139
Although the Form 1023-EZ requires applicants to attest that they meet
the organizational test, this study indicates that applicants are incorrectly
claiming compliance. If the false attestations were intentional, then the
Form 1023-EZ’s lack of rigor may be inviting fraud. If the false attestations
were unintentional, then the Form 1023-EZ is failing to properly educate
applicants. In either case, if the study’s numbers are at all representative,140
the criticism that the IRS is not assessing applicants appears to carry
weight.141
The real difference is the approach. The Form 1023-EZ asks for
attestations for certain requirements, whereas the Form 1023 requires proof.
For critics, this difference is vital, and the Form 1023-EZ’s shortcomings in
eliciting certain information creates opportunity for fraud.
III. AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CHARITIES MORE ALTRUISTIC
After over a year of experience, the IRS is very pleased with the Form
1023-EZ. In a report issued a year after the streamlined form’s introduction,
the IRS boasts that the Form 1023-EZ “is reducing taxpayer burden and
increasing cost effectiveness of [IRS] operations.”142 While there may be
some question as to the reduction of taxpayer burden, there is no doubt that
the IRS is more efficient. The embarrassing backlog of tax-exempt
applications has been eliminated; but at what cost?
Despite the chipper tone, the IRS is not deaf to the Form 1023-EZ
critics. But rather than jettison the form altogether, as many critics might
urge, the IRS has promised to adopt modest changes to the form. The
specific details of the changes have not been released at the time of this
Article, but in addition to some minor changes to the instructions, the
planned changes for the form include requiring the
identification of a point of contact or responsible person for
additional information requests, requiring the applicant to
139

Council Letter, supra note [__] at 7. “Likewise, the Taxpayer Advocate also raised
concerns about the streamlined 1023-EZ form, including a lack of empirical data
demonstrating that organizations anticipating less than $50,000 in gross annual receipts
pose low risks to compliance, a failure to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of
downstream consequences of the streamlined application, and a post-implementation to
correct potential compliance problems.” GAO Report, supra note [__] at 32.
140
With only 13 applications reviewed, this is certainly not a given.
141
Tax Notes, October 5, 2015, “Critics say Form 1023-EZ could allow unqualified
organizations to obtain exemptions because it does not ask applicants for enough
information about their activities.”
142
Form 1023-EZ First Year Report, Executive Summary available at [_____]
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attest that gross receipts or expected gross receipts are less
than $50,000, and requiring an independent attestation that
total assets are less than $250,000.143
To say the least, the proposed changes to the Form 1023-EZ are slight. The
IRS plans to add a contact person and include additional positive
attestations regarding the qualifications of the organization. These changes
are not likely to quell the concerns of critics, who believe that the Form
1023-EZ is both a dereliction of the IRS’s gatekeeping duty, and an
invitation to those who would use a tax-exempt organization to commit
fraud.
The substance of the IRS’s proposed changes makes it abundantly
evident that the IRS does not share the dire concerns of the Form 1023-EZ’s
harshest critics. The changes do not address the potential misuse of the
form, as the additional attestations are no barrier for an immoral individual
who wants to use the streamlined application process to obtain 501(c)(3)
status for personal enrichment. Although there is little evidence to show that
such immoral actors are utilizing the Form 1023-EZ, it does not take a
criminal mastermind to imagine the potential for exploitation.
Somewhat surprisingly, and certainly unintentionally, the IRS’s solution
to the administrative burden provides an opportunity to address the problem
of charities that act in a less-than-altruistic manner. Rather than follow the
advice of the harshest critics, we should embrace the Form 1023-EZ process
as a chance to encourage more altruistic charities. In the IRS’s desperate
attempt to curtail its administrative burden, it has inadvertently presented
the occasion to create a new family of charities—a group of charities that
does not strain any traditional definition of “charity.” As this section will
argue, in exchange for the use of this streamlined process, these charities
will agree to forgo salaried employees and commercial activity (together,
paying salaries and engaging in commercial activity are referred to as
“Disfavored Activities”). Such charities will, in a very real sense, be forced
to operate in a more altruistic manner.
A. Should We Treat Form 1023-EZ Filers Differently?
One might be concerned that the prohibition of Form 1023-EZ filers
from engaging in Disfavored Activities is a bit arbitrary. Does it logically
follow that we should not allow entities to pay salaries or engage in
commercial activity simply because we do not require as much information
on the front end? Perhaps not, but there are two distinct reasons for
143
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imposing such a restriction. The first is a response to the critics of the Form
1023-EZ: because the streamlined form creates a greater risk of immoral
actors taking advantage of a charity for improper personal gain, we should
do what we can to eliminate the potential for abuse (i.e., prohibit Disfavored
Activities). And because such entities have reduced reporting requirements,
there is no obvious means of monitoring the activities of Form 1023-EZ
filers. Thus, it is reasonable to completely disallow Disfavored Activities.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, banning Disfavored Activities
would create a family of charities that is restricted from engaging in selfregarding activities, thereby creating a more altruistic charity.
1. No Meaningful Oversight
The financial threshold for entities allowed to use the streamlined
application form, expected gross receipts below $50,000, was chosen by the
IRS to have the greatest impact. Designed to be as inclusive as possible, the
IRS expected “most small organizations, including as many as 70 percent of
all applicants, [will] qualify to use the new streamlined form.”144
At first blush, this might seem counterintuitive. Why, after all, would
the IRS voluntarily opt to collect less information from the majority of
applicants? A cynic might suggest that the IRS is merely trying to lessen its
administrative burden, and a more inclusive threshold will make the review
process easier. However, there is a less cynical justification: the IRS has
already determined that organizations with less than $50,000 in gross
receipts are too small to warrant scrutiny. This decision is evident in the
IRS’s decision to require virtually no reporting from such entities.
Due to their tax-exempt nature, charities are not required to submit the
tax returns required of for-profit entities. To bridge this gap, the IRS
requires annual information returns. Through these returns, the IRS reviews
and conducts oversight of charities not only at the inception of the entity’s
tax-exempt lifecycle (i.e., the Form 1023 or the Form 1023-EZ), but also on
an annual basis thereafter. Such information returns are either the Form 990,
Form 990-EZ, or Form 990-N.145
The information required by an annual information return varies
depending on the size of the charity. Generally speaking, the more gross
receipts realized by a charity, the more disclosure and information will be
required. For entities that have annual gross receipts over $200,000 or assets
greater than or equal to $500,000, the entity must submit a Form 990. This
144
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Viswanathan, supra note [___] page 89-90.
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annual information return, the most robust of the forms, requires the most
detailed information. The Form 990 requires basic financial information,
such as gross income, expenses, disbursements, a balance sheet, total
contributions received (including the names and address of certain
contributors), and salaries received by certain employees. Such information,
required by Section 6033 of the Code, is the only means for the IRS to
monitor the financial activities of the organization. In addition to financial
information, a charity filing a Form 990 is required to provide narrative
descriptions of the “three largest program services.”146 These narrative
descriptions must not merely describe the activities, but provide
specific measurements such as clients served, days of
care provided, number of sessions or events held, or
publications issued, [d]escribe the activity’s objective, for
both this time period and the longer-term goal, if the
output is intangible, such as in a research activity, [and
g]ive reasonable estimates for any statistical
information.147
The Form 990 thus provides a tremendous amount of information, requiring
charities to not only produce financial information, but also narrative
descriptions of the charity’s activities for the past year. Perhaps most
importantly, in addition to submitting the Form 990 to the IRS, charities are
required to make their Form 990s publicly available for inspection and
copying. Thus, the IRS and the public have the opportunity to scrutinize the
activities of charities, “providing … a realistic picture of the [charity] and
its operations, and promoting compliance with the federal tax law.”148
The Form 990 is a detailed and robust information-gathering tool. It
takes over 29 hours to learn about the law and almost 34 hours to complete
the form.149 Recognizing this burden, the IRS does not require all entities to
complete the Form 990. Charities that have annual gross receipts between
$50,000 and $200,000 and assets under $500,000 are required to complete a
less rigorous annual information return, the Form 990-EZ.
The Form 990-EZ is a significantly streamlined form, but it still requires
the basic financial information and narrative descriptions required by the
Form 990. But in the interest of saving time for smaller organizations, the
Form 990-EZ does not require command the Form 990’s level of detail. The
IRS estimates that it should take about 11.5 hours to learn about the law and
146
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14.5 hours to prepare the form.150 This is less than half the time it takes for
charities filing the Form 990.
The annual information returns for large and mid-sized charities (the
Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, respectively), each require charities to provide
some financial information and a narrative description of the charity’s
activities for the previous year. These charities must file these reports
annually and make the information available to the general public. This
provides some level of transparency for the public, and provides the
information to the IRS for potential enforcement or investigatory purposes.
For very small charities, however, the annual reporting requirement is quite
different.
The IRS requires charities that have annual gross receipts of less than
$50,000 to file the Form 990-N, or e-Postcard.151 The information elicited
by the e-Postcard is, to say the least, minimal. The form requires no
financial information beyond an attestation that the charity’s gross receipts
are normally $50,000 or less, and there is no requirement for a narrative
description of the activities of the charity. In fact, other than the
aforementioned attestation, there is no information other than the charity’s
name, address, website, and employer identification number, along with the
name and address of a principal officer. Below is an example of a
completed Form 990-N:

150

Id.
The alternative name for this form is quite descriptive, as the information is
provided only online (charities may not submit physical versions) and the information
elicited is minimal.
151
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2. Insufficiency of Disclosure for Small Charities
The stated purpose of the annual information returns is to provide
information about a particular organization.152 With this purpose in mind,
the lack of required disclosure by the Form 990N is alarming. As noted at
the bottom of the Form 990-N, filers should expect to spend about 15
minutes to complete and file the form. There is virtually no financial
information and absolutely no description of the charity’s activities. Most
notably for the purposes of this Article, there is no discussion of salaries
paid and no disclosure of commercial activities. At no point is the
organization required to provide any detailed financial information, and
there is no opportunity for the IRS to gauge the Disfavored Activities. The
organization may pay salaries without disclosing the amount of the salaries
(and therefore providing no data with which to measure reasonableness) and
the organization may engage in commercial activities that are related to the
charity’s purpose without any meaningful disclosure.153
Thus, if an organization has less than $50,000 in gross receipts, there is
virtually no transparency. At the outset of the organization’s tax-exempt
existence, the IRS requests the scant information required by the Form
1023-EZ. The Form 1023-EZ requires no financial information, no
disclosures regarding salaries,154 and no discussion of commercial activities.
Thereafter, the IRS annually requests the scant information required by the
Form 990N.
B. The Results: A More Charitable Charity
On a recent Tuesday evening, in a public housing development about
two miles north of the Las Vegas strip, a passerby would be forgiven for
suffering from some cognitive dissonance. Amidst the rows of identical
homes, poor lighting, and the ineffable dreariness of most public housing
complexes built in the 60s, one hears a raucously spirited chorus of the
Hokey Pokey. The singers are children, ranging in age from five to fourteen,
who live in the Sherman Gardens public housing development. The children
are at an afterschool program run by a small charity called the Nevada
Youth Network, and they are coming to the end of the evening session.
Twice a week, the Nevada Youth Network holds these sessions for children
in the neighborhood. Shortly after the song’s rousing ultimate refrain (you
152
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put your whole self in, you put your whole self out…), about two-dozen
children quickly calm down, sit cross-legged in precise rows, and await
instruction from Mike Flores. Mr. Flores, a volunteer and executive director
of Nevada Youth Network, tells the children that it is time for yoga and asks
for a volunteer to lead the group. An impossibly thin eight year old named
TJ volunteers. It’s no surprise that TJ volunteered, as he was one of the
most enthusiastic singers in a particularly energetic and enthusiastic
rendition of Hokey Pokey. Defying the residual energy of the song’s
performance, TJ sits calmly in front of the children and leads them in some
breathing and light stretching exercises.
Prior to singing and yoga, the children spent an hour working on their
homework, reading on their own, and listening to a volunteer read a book.
After yoga, they will head home with a snack and a drink. This scene, with
some variation, happens every Tuesday and Thursday in a pair of renovated
units in the Sherman Gardens public housing development thanks to the
Nevada Youth Network.
The Nevada Youth Network’s mission is “foster[ing] the growth
and independence of young people within communities of color.”155 The
primary activity of the Nevada Youth Network has been the afterschool
program. This program has been in operation for several years in the
Sherman Gardens public housing development. The afterschool program is
entirely volunteer-driven and has never been asked to pay rent.
After about two years of operation, the Las Vegas public housing
authority asked for Nevada Youth Network’s “tax-exempt paperwork,”
under the assumption that the Nevada Youth Network was a 501(c)(3)
organization. This assumption was not terribly out of line, the organization
certainly looked and acted like a tax-exempt organization: it did not charge
for the services and it provided a free service to a needy population. The
only problem was that this assumption was false. The leaders of the Nevada
Youth Network never applied for tax-exempt status. They weren’t trying to
commit fraud or skirt their responsibilities, but they just didn’t think
501(c)(3) status was necessary. After all, they were not planning to apply
for any grants that required 501(c)(3) status, and they did not ask the
general public for donations with the promise of tax-deductions. They were
a nonprofit organization, but they did not see any need to apply for taxexempt status. Unfortunately, the public housing authority told the Nevada
Youth Network that use of the space in Sherman Gardens would no longer
be rent-free without proof of 501(c)(3) status.
Setting aside the wisdom of the public housing authority using the
501(c)(3) status as a proxy for whether or not the organization should be
155
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allowed to operate without paying rent, the Nevada Youth Network is an
example of a charity tailor-made for the Form 1023-EZ.
The Nevada Youth Network’s budget is virtually zero. The space is
donated, the snacks are donated, and the volunteers donate their time. The
organization does not engage in any commercial activities to raise funds.
No salaries are paid. The organization simply opens its doors to children in
need of a safe place after the school day ends. While the volunteers are
richly rewarded on an emotional level, there is no expectation of pecuniary
remuneration. It is, in a very real sense, an altruistic endeavor. Indeed,
outside of the personal satisfaction provided by brightening a child’s day,
the entire endeavor is “free from the stain or taint of every consideration
that is personal, private, or selfish.” To the extent that we want to promote
altruistic activity, this is the type of charity that should be encouraged. More
to the point, it is the type of charity that would be encouraged by a Form
1023-EZ that did not permit Disfavored Activities.
CONCLUSION
Many areas of the law fail to meet the expectations of the laity, and
charity law is no exception. Any colloquial conception of charity contains
some expectation of altruism. While the plain meaning of many of the laws
governing charities contain hints that such an expectation exists, over a
century of case law and agency actions have removed any hint of requiring
altruism. Compounding the problem, the IRS, the agency charged with the
primary responsibility of overseeing charities is overburdened and
underfunded. We are therefore left with a largely unsupervised regime that
has largely abandoned altruistic ideals.
This does not have to be the case. Although the IRS’s decision to create
a virtual self-certification process for aspiring tax-exempt entities drew
sharp criticism, it has also provided an opportunity to reconsider how we
treat small charities. The criticisms of the streamlined application process
can be reduced to the concern that immoral actors will use charities to
commit fraud. Although there is talk of the Form 1023-EZ’s failure to
educate,156 the more urgent concern appears to be that dishonest individuals
would use charities for personal enrichment. The logical response would be
to impose strict policing mechanisms to ensure propriety. But given the
defunding of the IRS and the lack of interest by state authorities, this is not
realistic. Thus, in order to protect against fraud, the potential for fraud must
be reduced, and the most direct means of reducing the potential for fraud is
to remove the ability of charities to engage in activities that permit personal
156
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enrichment. In other words, we should ban the ability of entities that utilize
the streamlined application process from engaging in Disfavored Activities.
Although this will not render all charities more altruistic, it will help
encourage a large portion of charities to act in a more altruistic manner,
bringing the legal definition of charity closer to the popular conception of
charity.
***
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